In FSIA cases, plaintiffs and their counsel frequently fail to examine carefully at the outset of the litigation a foreign state entity’s status under section 1603. That mistake, which is easily avoidable, has resulted in numerous instances of defective service of process and other unnecessary delays in FSIA litigation.
In Howe v. Embassy of Italy, No. CV 13-1273 (BAH), 2014 WL 4449697 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2014), the court recently held that the Italian Embassy was a foreign state for purposes of the FSIA’s service provisions. The court relied on the “categorical” approach adopted by the D.C. Circuit in Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 30 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 1994), which examines if an entity is “an integral part of a foreign state’s political structure” in determining whether the entity qualifies as a “foreign state.” Howe, 2014 WL 4449697, at *5-6; see also Transaero, 30 F.3d at 151. The Howe court also relied on a line of FSIA cases that have determined that an embassy is part of the foreign state itself. See Howe, 2014 WL 4449697, at *6; see also Barot v. Embassy of Republic of Zam., No. 13-451, 2014 WL 1400849, at *4 (D.D.C. Apr. 11, 2014) (holding defendant foreign embassy in Washington, D.C., is “foreign state or [a] political subdivision of a foreign state” for FSIA purposes (alteration in original)); Ellenbogen v. The Can. Embassy, No. 05-1553, 2005 WL 3211428, at *2 (D.D.C. Nov. 9, 2005) (“[I]t is well-settled that an embassy is a ‘foreign state’ . . . not an ‘agency or instrumentality’ thereof”); Int’l Rd. Fed’n v. Embassy of Dem. Republic of the Congo, 131 F. Supp. 2d 248, 250 (D.D.C. 2001) (holding embassy of foreign state in Washington, D.C., a “foreign state” for the purposes of the FSIA and collecting cases); Underwood v. United Republic of Tanz., No. 94-902, 1995 WL 46383, at *2 (D.D.C. Jan. 27, 1995) (“Applying the categorical approach to the status of the Embassy, we conclude that as a matter of law an embassy of a sovereign nation is a foreign state which must be served pursuant to § 1608(a).”). Based upon this conclusion regarding the Italian Embassy’s status, the Howe court held that the plaintiff’s attempted service – which did not meet the requirements of section 1608(a) – was defective. Howe, 2014 WL 4449697, at *6.
It is not always easy to tell whether an entity is a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality thereof. While each entity must be analyzed separately in the context of the foreign political system at issue, a good rule of thumb is that ministries or departments, the military, and embassies will be deemed “foreign states” – and not agencies or instrumentalities thereof – under 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). See, e.g., Garb v. Republic of Poland, 440 F.3d 579, 597-98 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the Ministry of the Treasury of Poland is a foreign state and not an “agency or instrumentality” thereof); Transaero, 30 F.3d at 153 (“We hold that armed forces are as a rule so closely bound up with the structure of the state that they must in all cases be considered as the ‘foreign state’ itself, rather than a separate ‘agency or instrumentality’ of the state.”); Howe, 2014 WL 4449697, at *5-6 (holding that an embassy is a foreign state under section 1603(a)).
In any event, plaintiffs and their counsel would be well-served to examine the issue carefully at the outset of the case. An entity’s status can have a major impact on the ensuing litigation, including with respect to service (28 U.S.C. § 1608), jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3)), damages (28 U.S.C. § 1606), and attachment or execution (28 U.S.C. § 1610). An early resolution of the issue should not be difficult – Transaero is the key case to get the research started – and can avoid costly and unnecessary litigation.