In the recent case of TJGEM LLC v. Republic of Ghana, — F. Supp. 2d —, CV 13-382 (BAH), 2013 WL 6857988 (D.D.C. Dec. 31, 2013), District Judge Beryl Howell applied three important rules that are often implicated in cases under the FSIA’s commercial activity exception.
First, the district court emphasized that the commercial activity exception does not apply where the alleged commercial activity is unrelated to a plaintiff’s claims. Id. at *5; see also, e.g., Transatlantic Shiffahrtskontor GmbH v. Shanghai Foreign Trade Corp., 204 F.3d 384, 390 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that the term “‘based upon’ [under the commercial activity exception] requires a degree of closeness between the acts giving rise to the cause of action and those needed to establish jurisdiction that is considerably greater than common law causation requirements”).
Second, the court followed Phaneuf v. Republic of Indonesia, 106 F.3d 302, 308 (9th Cir.1997), in holding that apparent authority is insufficient to confer jurisdiction over a foreign state under the commercial activity exception. TJGEM LLC, 2013 WL 6857988, at *6; see also The Second Circuit’s Apparent FSIA Authority.
Third, the district court reaffirmed that an alleged financial loss to an American individual or firm does not satisfy the “direct effect” requirement of section 1605(a)(2)’s third clause. TJGEM LLC, 2013 WL 6857988, at *6; see also Recent Development: The D.C. Circuit’s Latest FSIA Decision.
District Judge Howell’s decision is interesting with respect to another issue that I have previously addressed on this blog. The district court held that to “survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the plaintiff must establish the court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter by a preponderance of the evidence.” TJGEM LLC, 2013 WL 6857988, at *4. The TJGEM case is therefore the latest opinion to indicate that traditional subject matter jurisdiction procedural rules apply with respect to a plaintiff’s burden under the FSIA. See Peterson v. Islamic Republic Of Iran, 627 F.3d 1117, 1125 (9th Cir. 2010) (“It must fall to the plaintiff to prove that immunity does not exist.”); see also Am. Telecom Co., L.L.C. v. Republic of Lebanon, 501 F.3d 534, 537 (6th Cir. 2007).